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WHO IS RIGHT ABOUT RESPONSIBILITY:
AN APPLICATION OF RIGHTS TALK TO
BALLA V. GAMBRO, INC. AND
GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP. V. ROSE
JUSTINE THOMPSON
In recent years, we have made great progress in making the
promise of rights a reality, but in doing so we have neglected
another part of our inheritance-the vision of a republic where
citizens actively take responsibility for maintaining a vital political
life.'
Mary Ann Glendon
[T]he public, and perhaps the profession itself, seem increasingly
convinced that lawyers are simply a plague on society.2
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.
INTRODUCTION
For many Americans, it would be difficult to imagine a nation
without lawyers. Corporate America would be unable to function
without lawyers, television would not be the same without "L.A.
Law," and accident victims would have no "800" numbers to call
when seeking to redress their injuries. Although few would dis-
agree with the proposition that American pop culture could sur-
vive without "L.A. Law," it is clear that lawyers are an integral
component of modem American society. Lawyers influence the
way Americans live, work, and argue. Lawyers even influence the
way Americans talk.3
1. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 17 (1991); see also Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert
Cover, 96 YALE L. 1860, 1862 (1987) (noting that "some ... charge that the preoccu-
pation with rights is an illness in this society that prevents the development of social
harmony").
2. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1240
(1991).
3. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 1; see also infra Section I(A).
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America's fascination with lawyers, however, is accompanied
by a widespread distrust of the legal profession. Whether deserved
or not, the legal profession has been saddled with the societal
perception that attorneys are greedy, opportunistic, and, above all,
unethical.' This negative perception of lawyers has not gone unno-
ticed in the legal community. As one scholar has noted, "[T]he
legal profession is in crisis today. The public ... perceives lawyers
as mean spirited, morally suspect, and ethically bankrupt."5 Nor
does this negative reputation appear to be wholly undeserved. For
instance, in a bar-sponsored pilot study, law students participated
in a program that explored the effects of the law firm environment
on the development of professional values.6 As part of the pro-
gram, students working in law firms were required to furnish ob-
servations of attorney conduct in written journals.7 Of eighty-one
journals, fifty-two included observations of flagrant misconduct,
thirty of which included descriptions of multiple episodes, for a
total of 107 episodes of misconduct.' The events that occurred
"did not present close questions where differing views could be
debated"; these were cases where an attorney's conduct was recog-
nized by the student writers to be patently wrong.9 Although the
possibility always exists that a study may not perfectly reflect
reality, the frequency and severity of the misconduct witnessed by
these law students suggest a problem that cannot be ignored.
Considering the widespread occurrence of ethical misconduct,
it is not difficult for legal scholars to agree that ethical problems
exist in the legal community. However, it is an entirely different
task to reach a consensus on how to solve the legal community's
ethical problems. Proposals for improvement of the legal
community's ethics are abundant. Some legal scholars believe that
improved ethical training and preparation in legal education will
increase the likelihood that lawyers will behave more ethically in
4. See Hazard, supra note 2, at 1240.
5. David C. Olsson, Reporting Peer Misconduct: Lip Service to Ethical Standards Is
Not Enough, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 657, 675 (1989). Complaints regarding the legal profession
are hardly new. In fact, "[d]issatisfaction with lawyers is a chronic grievance, and inspires
periodic calls for reform." Hazard, supra note 2, at 1239 (citations omitted).
6. Lawrence K. Hellman, The Effects of Law Office Work on the Formation of Law
Students' Professional Values: Observation, Explanation, Optimization, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 537, 557 (1991).
7. Id. at 565-66.




their professional practice. 0 Some scholars advocate stronger peer
review in the form of increased reporting by attorneys of miscon-
duct." To others, the problem lies not in the educational system
or in attorneys' willingness to report misconduct, but instead in
how the legal community has chosen to regulate its attorneys. For
instance, regulation of the legal profession, from requirements to
practice law to standards of ethical behavior, has traditionally been
"organized along generalist lines."12 Thus, for some, the solution
is to restructure ethical regulation in order to reflect specializations
within the legal profession. 3
Although many creative and promising proposals have been
developed to improve ethics in the legal community, one particular
theory deserves analysis. In Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of
Political Discourse, Mary Ann Glendon explores how Americans
engage in political dialogue and asserts that the content of this
dialogue influences the behavior of individuals. 4 In particular, she
is concerned that American political dialogue fails to include the
responsibilities that citizens may owe to one another.5 Glendon
advocates the incorporation of responsibilities into America's mode
of discourse, which, according to her theory, will lead to more
responsible behavior. 6 Although Glendon's theory focuses on the
manner in which people communicate, she also perceives the role
of the judiciary as integral in shaping individual behavior. In par-
ticular, in those instances when the law is silent or communicates
the absence of moral or ethical obligations, she advocates that the
judiciary respond by emphasizing the duty of citizens to act in a
responsible manner."
This Note explores whether Glendon's theory offers a solution
to the ethical problems facing the legal community and whether a
10. See Ronald M. Pipkin, Law School Instruction in Professional Responsibility: A
Curricular Paradox, 2 AM. B. FouND. RES. J. 247, 266 (1979).
11. See M. Reece Smith, Jr., Peer Review: Its Time Has Come, 66 A.B.A. J. 451
(1980).
12. F. Raymond Marks & Darlene Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession:
Is It Self-Regulation?, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 193, 236.
13. Id. ("The law license is a generalist license. Yet claims are made that the skills
are specialized. If the profession remains formally organized along generalist lines, it is
possible that any scheme of review of performance is doomed to failure.").
14. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 171.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 84.
1022 [Vol. 44:1020
RESPONSIBILITY AND RIGHTS TALK
responsibility-based approach would encourage ethical conduct
among attorneys. In order to determine the practical applicability
of Glendon's theory, the analysis focuses on a distinct ethical
problem: the ethical dilemma faced by an in-house counsel upon
discovering that her client has committed an act of misconduct.
Part I provides an overview of Glendon's responsibility-based ap-
proach and also examines the dilemma faced by the attorney serv-
ing as in-house counsel. Part II explores the extent to which Glen-
don's analysis can determine the appropriate judicial response that
would most likely encourage in-house counsel to engage in ethical
behavior, that of the Illinois Supreme Court in Balla v. Gambro,
Inc."8 or that of the California Supreme Court in General Dynam-
ics Corp. v. Rose." Part III reveals that application of Glendon's
theory alone does not indicate whether the holding of Balla or
General Dynamics would most likely encourage in-house attorneys
to behave responsibly. Despite many powerful insights, Glendon's
theory fails to provide tangible guidelines both to courts and indi-
viduals, and also fails to consider the social context of ethical
decisionmaking by individuals attempting to resolve ethical con-
flicts. And without more guidance, it is unlikely that the legal
community will be successful in its efforts to improve the ethics of
its attorneys.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Responsibility-Talk and Ethical Decisionmaking
Glendon begins Rights Talk by commenting on the pervasive-
ness of law in American society: "Americans today, for better or
worse, live in what is undoubtedly one of the most law-ridden
societies that has ever existed on the face of the earth., 20 Glen-
don perceives this highly legalistic culture as having a profound
impact on the United States. In terms of its direct effect, the per-
centage of those involved in legal careers is unsurpassed in our
history.21 Moreover, the law has a tremendous indirect impact on
those not involved in the law. Irrespective of class or background,
18. Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (III. 1991).
19. General Dynamics Corp. v. Rose, 876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994) (en banc).




Glendon asserts, Americans are consciously and unconsciously
affected by the law.'
Although the effect of the "'legalization' of popular cul-
ture"'  can be seen throughout society, Glendon focuses on the
impact of the law on how people talk and, in particular, on how
people incorporate legalism into political dialogue. 4 According to
Glendon, Americans discuss the issues that concern them within a
legalistic framework. Although she admits that the influence of the
law on how Americans communicate is hardly a new phenome-
non,' Glendon expresses concern about what she perceives as a
shift in the nature of this legalistic dialogue. She has noticed an
"increasing tendency to speak of what is most important to us in
terms of rights, and to frame nearly every social controversy as a
clash of rights."26 Thus, Glendon concludes that Americans today
are engaged in the exchange of "rights talk."'27
Glendon believes that the dialogue of rights talk is hindering
the positive development of American society. She notes that "our
rights talk, in its absoluteness, promotes unrealistic expectations,
heightens social conflict, and inhibits dialogue that might lead
toward consensus, accommodation, or at least the discovery of
common ground."2 This concentration on rights has rendered
American political dialogue combative, which in turn narrows the
range of possible solutions to society's ailments. As one scholar
has commented, rights talk is self-centered and makes collective
22. Id.
23. Id. at 3.
24. Id.
25. Glendon recounts de Tocqueville's visit to the United States in the early 1800s.
De Tocqueville observed that lawyers' habits and modes of discourse "infiltrate[d]
throughout society right down to the lowest ranks." Id. at 1 (quoting 1 ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270 (J.P. Mayer ed. & George Lawrence trans.,
1969)). According to de Tocqueville, the law and lawyers "left an unusually strong im-
print on the 'manners and morals' of the new nation." Id. at 2. Although the influence
of legal discourse on American society is not new, the level of that influence has dramat-
ically increased. Where Abraham Lincoln was "equally at home with the Bible and
Blackstone," politicians today rely primarily on legalism. Id. at 3.
26. Id. at 4.
27. Id. at 3.
28. Id. at 14.
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action increasingly difficult.2 9 Succinctly stated, "[r]ights alone do
not make a good society."30
The problem with rights talk is not limited to its power to
heighten social conflict and reduce cooperation. Glendon's greatest
concern appears to be not what rights talk incorporates, but what
it excludes. "Our rights-laden public discourse easily accommodates
the economic, the immediate, and the personal dimensions of a
problem," she writes, "while it regularly neglects the moral, the
long-term, and the social implications., 3' Glendon stresses that
rights talk is missing the language of responsibility. And for
Glendon, it is the language of responsibility that has the potential
to mend some of the problems inherent in our rights-based soci-
ety.32 As Thomas Barton has noted, "Professor Glendon has giv-
en us what rights talk does not: an invitation to a dialogue of
accommodation and responsibility";33 it is through such a dialogue
that American society will be able to begin to solve many of its
problems.
An example of the applicability of Glendon's concerns can be
seen within the context of the legal community. Unlike the law in
most European countries, American jurisprudence does not recog-
nize a duty to aid a fellow human being who may be in danger.
29. David Abraham, Are Rights the Right Thing? Individual Rights, Communitarian
Purposes and America's Problems, 25 CONN. L. REV. 947, 953 (1993) (reviewing GLEN-
DON, supra note 1) ("Worse yet, rights campaigns produce negative synergy: every cam-
paign for rights inevitably elicits claims of counter-rights so that potential social solidarity
gives way to individual absolutism, group egotism, and the disappearance of social obliga-
tion.").
30. Id. at 950. "If nothing else, the title of Glendon's book is directly on the mark.
Trapped in a battle for rights, the dominant strand of social activism in America has
failed to transcend ...the inequalities lying at its heart and in its soul." Id. at 952.
31. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 171. As Thomas Barton noted,
Glendon properly calls our attention to the shallowness of rights talk, to the
way it exacerbates antagonism, and to its role in the continuing impoverishment
of our political dialogue. She understands that, despite our denials and bluster-
ing protestations of self-sufficiency, modem life makes us all mutually depen-
dent. She is right to call for greater individual responsibilities; and she is right
to ask us to recognize that freedom and equality cannot long endure a rhetoric
focused only on winning.
Thomas D. Barton, Reclaiming Law Talk, 81 CAL. L. REV. 803, 814-15 (1993) (reviewing
GLENDON, supra note 1).
32. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 76.
33. Barton, supra note 31, at 814.
34. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 77; id. at 79 ("[N]o matter how strongly our moral
sentiments might dictate a response, a person has no legal duty to rescue a 'stranger.' ");
see also Abraham, supra note 29, at 956 ("[Legal education] emphasizes the absence of
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For many lawyers, examination of this doctrine has constituted a
distinctive and memorable part of their legal education:
As part of the process through which young men and women are
socialized into the legal profession, they have entered into the
mental horizon of many American public officials. Year in and
year out, all over the country, in a kind of initiation rite, first-
year law students have been challenged by their professors of
torts or criminal law to come up with a theory to support legal
redress against the swimmer who watches while the toddler
drowns.... One by one, their ideas are shot down."
In classroom dialogue, law students are explicitly taught to disre-
gard the moral responsibility one may otherwise owe another. Be-
cause the dialogue focuses on an individual's rights, an individual
faced with the choice of either helping someone in need or assert-
ing her right to refrain from rendering aid may be more likely to
choose the latter course of action.
In response to what she perceives as the negative impact of
the duty to rescue doctrine, Glendon's theory advocates the incor-
poration of responsible language into the dialogue. In particular,
this language should be included in legal discourse. According to
Glendon, "What is more likely to surprise and disappoint an aver-
age citizen is the sense that the law appears to condone particular-
ly shocking forms of anti-social behavior: failures to warn, or act,
or summon aid."36 Thus, she advocates that the law, and the lan-
guage surrounding that law, should focus not on the right to be
free from the duty, but on the affirmative duty of an individual to
help another.37 By shifting the focus to include responsibility, in-
dividuals would be more likely to aid those in need.
obligation to others .... As every law student is taught, we have no legal duty to res-
cue a stranger unless we ourselves caused the peril he faces.").
35. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 80.
36. Id. at 83-84 (emphasis added).
Whether meant to be or not, law is now regarded by many Americans as the
principal carrier of those few moral understandings that are widely shared by
our diverse citizenry .... The absence of a legal obligation to come to the aid
of another in peril can begin to miseducate a public ....
Id. at 87.
37. Id. at 101.
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B. In-House Counsel and the Client
If Glendon's analysis is correct, her theory may be applied to
other circumstances as well. For instance, in the context of this
Note, Glendon's theory could aid an attorney in making the re-
sponsible choice when that attorney has discovered misconduct by
a client. Moreover, a responsibility-based approach could help
courts determine what judicial response would most likely encour-
age individuals to take an affirmative act in fulfilling one's ethical
responsibilities.
1. The Dilemma of Reporting a Client's Unethical Con-
duct. Historically, attorneys have served the public in a variety of
roles, from sole practitioners and attorneys for the government to
members of established law firms. In addition to these more
traditional roles, many attorneys have chosen to serve as in-house
counsel for corporate clients. In recent years, the number of
attorneys serving as in-house counsel has increased dramatically:
"According to a study conducted in the early 1980's, 50,000
lawyers were on corporate payrolls, a figure double that of 15
years earlier; a more recent survey indicates that more than 10
percent of all lawyers in the United States are employed in-house
by corporations."38 Based on the sheer numbers of attorneys
serving in these roles, the impact of in-house counsel on .corporate
America could be profound. Moreover, in-house counsel "affect
the full range of corporate decisions."39 Thus, choices made by
in-house counsel may have effects that go well beyond the
.confines of the corporate legal department.
While serving as in-house counsel, an attorney is obligated to
fulfill a number of responsibilities. The scope of these responsi-
bilities is delineated in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Rules).40 The requirements outlined in the Rules frequently en-
compass activities involving the attorney-client relationship. For
example, in-house counsel may not "reveal information relating to
38. General Dynamics Corp. v. Rose, 876 P.2d 487, 491 (Cal. 1994) (en banc) (citing
CHARLES XV. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 13.7.3 (1986)).
39. Grace M. Giesel, The Ethics or Employment Dilemma of In-House Counsel, 5
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 535, 544 (1992).
40. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1991). Thirty-one states have adopt-
ed these Rules in some form. See 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & WILLIAM HODES,
THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT 865 (Supp. 1989).
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representation of a client" without the consent of that client.4"
The duties owed to a client clearly do not stop with the protection
of attorney-client confidences. For instance, if an attorney knows
that "an officer, employee or other person associated with the
organization" intends to violate a legal obligation to the corpora-
tion, or violate a law that could reasonably be imputed to the
organization, the lawyer "shall proceed as is reasonably necessary
in the best interest of the organization."' 42 Of course, the respon-
sibilities of an attorney, whether in-house or not, also include
duties to the legal profession and to the public at large. As stated
in the preamble to the Rules, an attorney must always fulfill her
responsibilities as "an officer of the legal system and a public
citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice. '43
One of the more controversial ethical responsibilities imposed
on in-house counsel is the reporting requirement. The Rules per-
mit an attorney, at her discretion, to report misconduct of a client
in order to prevent the commission of a criminal act likely to
result in death or serious bodily injury.4 Some states, however,
have chosen not to follow the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct and have eliminated the discretionary element of the report-
ing requirement. For instance, in Illinois, an attorney must report
privileged information if it is necessary to prevent criminal activity
that may result in death or serious bodily injury.45 Moreover, the
41. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1991).
42. Id. Rule 1.13.
43. Id. Preamble.
44. See id. Rule 1.6(b). The full text of Rule 1.6 provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client
unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are im-
pliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated
in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer be-
lieves is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge
or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was in-
volved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of the client.
45. See Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 109 (II1. 1991) ("A lawyer shall re-
veal information about a client to the extent it appears necessary to prevent . . . death
or serious bodily injury." (citing ILL. R.P.C. 1.6(b))); In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790, 793
(Ill. 1988) (citing ILL. R.P.C. 103(a), which states that a lawyer "shall" report certain
misconduct). The states in which reporting is required are Arizona, Connecticut, Illinois,
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courts rigorously enforce the reporting requirements; if an attorney
fails in her duty to report possible criminal violations or miscon-
duct, the penalties can be severe and may even include suspension
or disbarment.46 The controversial nature of this rule, however,
stems not from the mere existence of the reporting requirement,
but from the consequences that follow compliance: many attorneys
lose their jobs.47 While rigorous enforcement of the reporting
requirement may benefit society by deterring undesirable client
conduct, this benefit is extracted at the expense of the attorney.
An examination of the unique pressures that are present
whenever an attorney serves as in-house counsel for one client
reveals why the loss of an attorney's job is so controversial. In a
large firm, the loss of a client may result in the loss of income.
However, because in-house counsel typically serve only one client,
the loss of that client will lead to a total loss of income.4 Thus,
in-house counsel are unusually subject to financial pressures that a
client may be able to exert. Moreover, "[t]he unfortunate plight of
in-house attorneys is increasingly disturbing since their oneness
with their employer-clients creates an atmosphere in which more
improper requests may occur."49 In addition to the possible finan-
cial implications of complying with the reporting requirements, the
attorney may also be subject to peer pressure and divided loyal-
ties. The attorney may be reluctant to report misconduct because
she feels a sense of loyalty to a client whom she also considers a
Nevada, North Dakota, and Texas. STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, JR., REGULA-
TION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 59 (1994).
46. See Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 109 (holding that in-house counsel do not "have a
choice of whether to follow their ethical obligations as attorneys . . .or . . .[the] unethi-
cal demands of their clients" and "must abide by the Rules of Professional Conduct"); In
re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d at 796 (suspending attorney for one year for failure to report
misconduct by client's former attorney).
47. See Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 106 (involving in-house counsel fired for insisting that
client comply with FDA regulations); Mourad v. Automobile Club Ins. Ass'n, 465 N.W.2d
395, 397 (Mich. 1991), appeal denied, 478 N.W.2d 443 (Mich. 1991) (involving attorney
fired for refusal to violate Code of Professional Conduct); Nordling v. Northern States
Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 500 (Minn. 1991) (involving attorney allegedly fired for ob-
jecting to a proposal to investigate personal lives of employees); Parker v. M & T Chem-
icals, Inc., 566 A.2d 215, 218 (NJ. 1989) (involving attorney fired for refusing to join
scheme to cheat competitor).
48. Giesel, supra note 39, at 536.
49. Id. at 547 ("The close identification of the attorney to the employer-client and its
agents may blind the attorney to ethical issues or the employer-client may be able to
persuade the attorney to ignore ethical issues.").
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friend. Moreover, the employer-client may consider the attorney to
be "a friend and loyal member of the team";50 a client feeling
personally betrayed by the disclosure of confidential information
by an attorney might subject that attorney to social ostracization.
Thus, an attorney serving as in-house counsel may face the diffi-
cult choice of fulfilling her ethical obligations, thereby risking fi-
nancial and emotional catastrophe, or complying with a client's
unethical demands and risking suspension or disbarment.
Avoiding these pressures is virtually impossible because the
client can take her business elsewhere.5 1 Moreover, an in-house
attorney when faced with the difficult decision of reporting miscon-
duct, is subject to the unique pressures of a corporate client that is
not usually a member of the Bar and thus has no legal responsi-
bility to uphold the Rules. 2 The likelihood that this scenario
could occur is evident from studies on the ethics of the corpora-
tions themselves: "[I]t is not uncommon for large and respected
corporations to commit crimes. Eleven percent of the largest 1000
American corporations were involved in bribery, fraud, price-fixing,
or other crimes between 1970 and 1980.",5 In-house counsel may
be facing the dilemma of choosing between ethical duties and job
security more often than most people may suspect.
2. A Solution for the Ethical Attorney. A potential solution
to the dilemma facing in-house counsel following the discovery of
unethical or illegal conduct by a client is to permit the attorney to
sue her client if the client fires her for refusing to violate her
ethical duties.54 By permitting a cause of action against the client,
the attorney's financial losses are mitigated. Furthermore, the
50. Id.
51. William L. Hutton, Note, The Lawyer's Duty to Report Another Lawyer's Miscon-
duct, 14 S. ILL. U. U. 683, 688 (1990) (citations ommitted):
Problems will occur, however, when clients take their business elsewhere to find
a lawyer who will, at the clients' request, refrain from reporting the previous
attorney's misconduct. If these clients' efforts are successful, then the
profession's attempt to self-regulate will become a mockery. Therefore, unless
the entire profession is induced to adhere strictly to the rule, it will be viewed
as simply another obstacle to be avoided.
52. Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 16
(1991).
53. Id. at 7 n.41 (citing Irwin Ross, How Lawless Are Big Companies?, FORTUNE,
Dec. 1, 1980, at 56, 57).
54. See General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994) (en
banc) (permitting in-house counsel to sue client for retaliatory discharge).
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client, rather than the attorney, bears the financial repercussions
resulting from the client's improper behavior. Although such a
cause of action would not alleviate the emotional pressures that an
attorney may face, the added financial security may induce the
attorney to fulfill her responsibilities under the reporting
requirement.
Despite the dilemma that in-house counsel face, a court may
refuse to recognize claims of retaliatory discharge for attorneys
fired for upholding ethics codes, thus leaving an attorney with no
legal recourse."5 The primary obstacle preventing an attorney
from bringing a retaliatory discharge action against a former em-
ployer is the presumption that employment contracts are termina-
ble at-will: 56
Since the end of the nineteenth century, state and federal courts
have presumed that employees are terminable at-will and can be
fired "for good cause, for no cause, or even for cause morally
wrong, without [the employer] being thereby guilty of legal
wrong." Conversely, employees have the reciprocal right to quit
at any time. The at-will presumption, combined with the constitu-
tional protection of freedom of contract in other labor cases at
the beginning of the century, made it nearly impossible for an
employee to rebut the at-will presumption.
Thus, the at-will doctrine allows either the employer or the em-
ployee to terminate an employment contract without just cause. 8
The employer is legally entitled to fire an attorney for fulfilling
her ethical duties, no matter how unfair such a dismissal may
seem. It is unclear whether or not the at-will doctrine applies to
situations in which a law firm fires an attorney for complying with
rules of ethical conduct. 9 However, with few exceptions, courts
55. See Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 108 (Ill. 1991). For a survey of judi-
cial decisions addressing this issue, see Sara A. Corello, In-House Counsel's Right to Sue
For Retaliatory Discharge, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 389 (1992).
56. Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 89 (N.Y. 1983) (noting
the "long settled rule that where an employment is for an indefinite term it is presumed
to be a hiring at will which may be freely terminated by either party at any time for
any reason or even for no reason" (citations omitted)).
57. Corello, supra note 55, at 390-91 (citations omitted).
58. Id.
59. See Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 499, 502 (Minn.
1991) (suggesting that law firm employee would not be barred from bringing suit for
wrongful discharge as it would not interfere with the attorney-client relationship); Wieder
v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105, 109 (N.Y. 1992) (permitting attorney terminated for complying
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strictly enforce the at-will doctrine when the employer is also the
attorney's client.'
The rationale behind denying an attorney recovery for retalia-
tory discharge against a client is based primarily on the concern
that a cause of action might compromise the trust that constitutes
the foundation of the relationship between an attorney and her
client. There is a common understanding based on trust between
attorney and client that encourages open and candid communica-
tion: "[T]he danger exists that if in-house counsel are granted a
right to sue their employers,... employers might ... limit their
communication with their in-house counsel."' 6' As one court not-
ed,
At the heart of the attorney-client relationship is the element of
trust. If the relationship is to work, the client must confide in the
attorney, trusting that the attorney will keep confidences and will
ably perform. If the client loses this confidence, whether justifi-
ably or not, the client must be able, without penalty, to end the
relationship.62
Courts are also reluctant to abandon the at-will doctrine to pre-
vent in-house counsel from shifting the costs of enforcing legal
ethics codes onto clients.' As the Illinois Supreme Court noted,
"[I]t would be inappropriate for the employer/client to bear the
economic costs and burdens of their in-house counsel's adhering to
their ethical obligations under the Rules of Professional Con-
duct." 64
with ethics codes to recover on an implied-in-law contract theory).
60. See Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 109 (Ill. 1991) (holding in-house
counsel do not have a claim of retaliatory discharge); Nordling, 478 N.W.2d at 501 (hold-
ing status as an in-house attorney did not entitle plaintiff to breach of contract damages).
But see General Dynamics Corp. v. Rose, 876 P.2d 487, 490 (Cal. 1994) (en banc) (hold-
ing both in-house counsel and non-attorney employees are entitled to advance retaliatory
discharge claims).
61. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 109. But see General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 487 (discussed
infra Part II).
62. Nordling, 478 N.W.2d at 501.
63. Costs incurred by attorneys resulting from reporting unethical conduct can be
high. For example, the losses of the attorney in Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y.
1992), included lost wages and $30,000 in additional expenses. Christopher Senior, Does
New York's Code of Professional Responsibility Force Lawyers to Put Their Jobs on the
Line? A Critical Look at Wieder v. Skala, 9 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 417, 421 (1992).
64. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 110.
1032 [Vol. 44:1020
RESPONSIBILITY AND RIGHTS TALK
In Herbster v. North American Co. for Life & Health Insur-
ance, the court indicated that a plaintiff may be allowed to bring a
claim for wrongful discharge against a former employer if the
discharge "was in contravention of a clearly mandated public poli-
cy."'65 In its application, however, this exception to the at-will
doctrine may afford little relief to the wrongfully discharged attor-
ney. The Herbster court held that the public policy considerations
were not great enough to allow a cause of action where the attor-
ney was discharged for refusing to destroy discovery informa-
tion.66 In Balla v. Gambro, the same court refused to find a
cause of action for an attorney who was dismissed for reporting
his employer's attempt to distribute defective, and potentially life-
threatening, kidney dialyzers.67 Although recognizing the impor-
tance of protecting the public from harm, the court found that the
public policy concerns were adequately safeguarded by the Illinois
Rules of Professional Conduct requiring an attorney to report
illegal conduct.68 If the public interest in saving lives is insuffi-
cient to overcome the presumption of an at-will employment con-
tract, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which the public policy
concerns would be sufficient to allow an attorney to recover for
wrongful discharge.
There have been circumstances in which courts have permitted
an attorney to recover for wrongful discharge. For instance, in
Mourad v. Automobile Club Insurance Ass'n, an attorney was per-
mitted to recover for breach of contract after he was constructively
discharged following his refusal to violate the Code of Professional
Conduct.69 However, Mourad is an exception to the rule; the
court found that the employer had violated an implied covenant in
the company policy manual." Aside from those situations when
65. Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343, 344 (Ill.
1986), appeal denied, 508 N.E.2d 728 (Ill. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 150 (1987) (cita-
tions omitted).
66. See id. at 348.
67. See Balla, 584 N.E.2d 104, 110 (I11. 1991).
68. Id. at 108.
69. See Mourad v. Automobile Club Ins. Ass'n, 465 N.W.2d 395, 397 (Mich. 1991),
appeal denied, 478 N.W.2d 443 (Mich. 1991).
70. See id. at 398. The exception in Mourad suggests that an attorney may be able
to anticipate the need to bring a suit against a former client by incorporating the right
to sue into an employment contract. However, it is unlikely that such a clause would be
upheld. In Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 501 (Minn. 1991),
the court found that the client's right to fire an attorney is implied in every attorney-
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an attorney can rely on a promise found in a policy manual, it is
difficult for an attorney to bring an action for retaliatory discharge
against a former client.
II. APPLYING THE MISSING LANGUAGE OF RESPONSIBILITY TO
THE DILEMMA OF IN-HOUSE COUNSEL
Although a survey of the cases addressing an attorney's right
to sue a client demonstrates that the likelihood of bringing a suc-
cessful action against a former client may be small, a recent deci-
sion by the California Supreme Court suggests that such a cause of
action may be possible, at least in California. In General Dynamics
Corp. v. Rose, the California Supreme Court departed from the
traditional view by deciding that the dilemma confronting in-house
counsel justified permitting a cause of action against the client for
wrongful termination.7' The California Supreme Court's holding
in General Dynamics is inconsistent with the leading case, Balla v.
Gambro, Inc., in which the Illinois Supreme Court denied in-house
counsel the right to sue a client for retaliatory discharge. The
General Dynamics court and the Balla court were confronted with
similar factual situations, yet arrived at different conclusions. Al-
though reconciliation of Balla and General Dynamics may be diffi-
cult, Glendon's responsibility analysis may provide a framework in
which to determine which court reached the optimal solution.
Within such a framework,, the decision that valued responsibility
above rights may be viewed as the decision most likely to encour-
age ethical behavior within the legal community.
A. Balla v. Gambro, Inc. and General Dynamics Corp. v. Rose
At the time that the facts of Balla arose, Gambro, Inc.
(Gambro) was a U.S.-based company that distributed kidney dialy-
sis machines manufactured by Gambro's German counterpart.73
The distribution of these machines was regulated by various feder-
al agencies, including the United States Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA).74 Roger Balla was an attorney serving Gambro as
client contract. Courts may be reluctant to permit parties to contract around this right.
71. See General Dynamics Corp. v. Rose, 876 P.2d 487, 490 (Cal. 1994) (en banc).
72. Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 108 (I11. 1991).
73. Id. at 105.
74. Id.
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its director of administration, general counsel, and manager of
regulatory affairs.75
In 1985, Gambro's German counterpart, in shipping certain
dialyzers to Gambro, included a description of that shipment.76
Based on the information provided by the German company, Balla
advised Gambro to reject the shipment for failure to comply with
FDA regulations.77 The president of Gambro decided to accept
the shipment despite Balla's advice. Balla reiterated that accep-
tance of the shipment would violate FDA regulations and further
informed the president of Gambro that he would do whatever was
necessary to prevent the sale of the dialyzers.78 Balla was subse-
quently fired, at which time he reported the shipment to the
FDA.79 The FDA seized the equipment and found that the ship-
ment was "adulterated" and in violation of federal law.8
Subsequently, Balla brought suit against his former employer,
Gambro, based on the tort theory of wrongful discharge.81 The
Illinois Supreme Court found that Balla believed that the sale of
the adulterated dialyzers could result in serious injury or death to
kidney patients.' Moreover, the court stated that "[t]here is no
public policy more important or more fundamental than the one
favoring the effective protection of the lives and property of citi-
zens." 83 However, the court denied Balla recovery based primarily
on the court's recognition of the value of preserving the sanctity
of the attorney-client relationship and the importance of the at-will
doctrine in the attorney-client context.84
Andrew Rose served as corporate in-house counsel for a dif-
ferent U.S. corporation, General Dynamics' Pomona plantY Hav-
ing worked for General Dynamics for approximately fourteen
years, Rose, like Balla, was not terminated for incompetence. 6







82. Id. at 107.
83. Id. at 107-08 (quoting Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876,
879 (Ill. 1981)).
84. Id. at 107-13.
85. General Dynamics Corp. v. Rose, 876 P.2d 487, 490 (Cal. 1994) (en banc).
86. Id. Rose believed that his termination was not based on "any loss of confidence
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Instead, according to Rose, he was terminated following "an at-
tempt by company officials to cover up widespread drug use
among the General Dynamics workforce, a refusal to investigate
the mysterious 'bugging' of the office of the company's chief of
security, and the displeasure of company officials over certain legal
advice Rose had given them" regarding the company's actions.87
Although there is no evidence that indicates Rose actually report-
ed the conduct of his client, Rose, like Balla, "spearheaded an
investigation into employee drug use" and protested "the
company's failure to investigate the bugging of the office of the
chief of security" and violations of the federal Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act.' In granting Rose the right to recover, the Supreme
Court of California specifically declined to follow Balla and held
that "there is no valid reason why an in-house attorney should not
be permitted to pursue ... [a] claim in the same way as the
nonattorney employee."8 9
B. Who Is Responsible?
In applying Glendon's responsibility framework to the dispa-
rate outcomes in Balla and General Dynamics, it is important to
begin by defining the responsibilities that an attorney serving as
in-house counsel should be expected to fulfill. Clearly, both Balla
and Rose should have been expected to "provide competent repre-
sentation" to their clients.9" This representation includes, among
other duties, "the fiduciary duty an attorney owes to a client."9 1
However, more pertinent in the present situation, both Balla and
Rose were responsible for protecting the confidences of the cli-
ent.9 The scope of this responsibility extends beyond just the in-
terests of the client as can be seen by examining the rationale be-
in his legal ability or commitment" to the company's interest. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 491.
89. Id.
90. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1992).
91. Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 108 (Il. 1991).
92. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUC Rule 1.6 (1992).
1036 [Vol. 44:1020
RESPONSIBILITY AND RIGHTS TALK
hind the attorney-client privilege.93 The attorney-client privilege
serves to encourage
full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients
and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance
of law and administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that
sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such
advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer being fully informed
by the client.94
Thus, in deciding which court arrived at the preferred outcome, it
is important to determine whether the courts considered the
attorneys' responsibilities to the client, the importance of attorney-
client confidences, and the broader public interests implicated by
upholding the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship. I
The Balla court, in denying the attorney the right to recover
against his client, based its reasoning on the importance of uphold-
ing the attorney's responsibility to the client. In rejecting the
attorney's claim, the court considered not only the purpose of the
tort of retaliatory discharge, but also "the effect on the attorney-
client relationship that extending the tort would have."9 5 It re-
fused to consider an intrusion into the sanctity of the attorney-
client relationship and supported its decision with strong responsi-
bility language.96 In contrast, the General Dynamics court, while
failing to permit the attorney to breach attorney-client confidential-
ity summarily, appeared to place a lower value on the attorney-
client relationship than the Balla court did. Instead, the General
93. The attorney-client privilege is distinguished from attorney-client confidences in
the comments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
The attorney-client privilege applies in judicial and other proceedings in which a
lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence
concerning a client. The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations
other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion
of law. The confidentiality rule applies not merely to matters communicated in
confidence by the client but also to all information relating to representation,
whatever its source. A lawyer may not disclose such information except as au-
thorized or required by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.
Id. Rule 1.6 cmt. 5 (1992).
94. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 110 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,
389 (1981)).
95. Id. at 108.
96. Id. at 109 ("In-house counsel must abide by the Rules of Professional Con-
duct."); see also id. at 110 ("However difficult economically and perhaps emotionally it is
for in-house counsel[,] . . . we refuse to allow in-house counsel to sue their employer-cli-
ent."); id. ("All attorneys know or should know that . . . they will have to forgo eco-
nomic gains in order to protect the integrity of the legal profession.").
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Dynamics court applied a balancing test accommodating the con-
flicting values of the attorney-client relationship and the attorney's
interests in secure employment.' Thus, at least in terms of the
responsibility that an attorney owes with respect to the confidences
given to the attorney by the client, the Balla court's reasoning
more closely resembles the responsibility-based approach advocated
by Glendon: it defined the responsibility, focused the language of
its decision on that responsibility, and even took the analysis fur-
ther by requiring the attorney to fulfill his responsibility to his
client.
Other responsibilities owed by attorneys to clients beyond
protecting the confidentiality between attorney and client further
suggest that Balla more closely adheres to Glendon's principles.
For instance, according to Glendon, economics should not be a
governing principle in public dialogue: "Our rights-laden public
discourse easily accommodates the economic, the immediate, and
the personal dimensions of a problem, while it regularly neglects
the moral, the long-term, and the social implications."98 The
Balla court appears to base its decision on principles consistent
with Glendon's approach, holding that "it would be inappropriate
for the employer/client to bear the economic costs and burdens of
their in-house counsel's adhering to their ethical obligations under
the Rules of Professional Conduct."99 Although taking into ac-
count the interests of the client, the Balla court clearly rejected
the proposition that the attorney should prevail because of eco-
nomic hardship. Instead, the court required the attorney to uphold
his responsibilities and bear the costs of "obeying the Rules of
Professional Conduct." 10°
In stark contrast, the General Dynamics court explicitly ac-
cepted the argument that denial of the right to sue would impose
an undue financial burden on the attorney. 1' The court found
that Rose was a career-oriented employee and had certain finan-
cial expectations that were undermined by the client."° Based on
these findings, the court held in favor of Rose. And by relying on
97. General Dynamics Corp. v. Rose, 876 P.2d 487, 490 (Cal. 1994) (en banc).
98. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 171.
99. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 110.
100. Id.
101. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 502.
102. Id. at 495-96.
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these financial arguments, General Dynamics appears to contradict
Glendon's responsibility principles.
At this juncture, it is possible to argue that the General Dy-
namics court's holding, in its apparent rejection of the responsibili-
ties owed the client, is nevertheless correct. Although it did not
appear to value the confidential nature of the attorney-client rela-
tionship to the same extent as the Balla court, the General Dy-
namics court did take into account the attorney's responsibility to
the public and to the legal profession. It found that both groups
have an interest in deterring unethical behavior of clients, 3
which, in General Dynamics, included illegal bugging and wide-
spread drug use."° Implicit in the court's decision was a recogni-
tion that permitting a cause of action would increase the likelihood
that a client's unethical behavior would be reported. However, al-
though it is true that the General Dynamics court took the respon-
sibility owed to the public into account, the Balla court also re-
quired an attorney to fulfill this responsibility. As the Balla court
stated, "The public policy[,] ... that of protecting the lives and
property of citizens, is adequately safeguarded," because Balla is
required to report Gambro's intention to sell adulterated dialyzers
under the Illinois version of Rule 1.6.15 The court continued,
"In-house counsel do not have a choice of whether to follow their
ethical obligations as attorneys licensed to practice law, or follow
the illegal and unethical demands of their clients. In-house counsel
must abide by the [Illinois] Rules of Professional Conduct."'0 6
And the Rules of Professional Conduct require an attorney to
report conduct that would result in death or serious injury."
103. Id. at 497-98, 501-02.
104. Id. at 490.
105. Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 108-09 (I11. 991). It is interesting to note
that in Illinois, an attorney is required to report the conduct of a client that may result
in serious injury or death. However, in California, the duty is permissive: an attorney
may report the conduct but is not absolutely required to do so. Compare CAL. EVID.
CODE § 956.5 (West Supp. 1995) (An attorney may reveal confidential communications
"if the lawyer reasonably believes that disclosure . . . is necessary to prevent the client
from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in death or
substantial bodily harm.") with ILL. R.P.C. 1.6(b) (1990) ("A lawyer shall reveal informa-
tion about a client to the extent it appears necessary to prevent the client from commit-
ting an act that would result in death or serious bodily harm." (emphasis added)). See
supra note 45 and accompanying text.
106. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 109.
107. Id. (citing ILL. R.P.C. 1.6(b) (1990)).
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Thus, although the General Dynamics court considered the inter-
ests of the public, the Balla court required the attorney to fulfill
his responsibilities to the public, to the legal profession, and to the
client; Balla required the attorney to protect the public from harm
and prevented the attorney from shifting the costs to the client.
Not only did the Balla court take into account responsibilities
owed to the client, the public, and the legal profession, but the
court also explicitly repudiated the rights-based approach put forth
by the attorney. By suing under a retaliatory discharge theory, the
attorneys in both Balla and General Dynamics were attempting to
protect their rights to employment with the particular clients. In
fact, the Balla court framed the attorney's cause of action in terms
of a rights-based action by noting that the attorney sought "a right
to sue ... employers in tort for retaliatory discharge."' 8 How-
ever, the Balla court rejected this right by denying the attorney a
cause of action and declined to extend the availability of a retalia-
tory discharge action to in-house counsel. 9 In contrast, General
Dynamics did not reject the attorney's rights-based approach. In-
stead, the court recognized that the attorney had a strong interest
in maintaining his employment with the company. Pivotal factors
in the court's decision included the fact that "the plaintiff was
hired as a 'career oriented' employee with an expectation of per-
manent employment, provided his performance was satisfactory;
that he was promised job security and substantial retirement bene-
fits; [and] that he regularly received outstanding performance re-
views, promotions, salary increases, and commendations .... 110
And these factors defined the "rights" that, according to the court,
were impermissibly abridged by the client. Thus, the General Dy-
namics court appeared to reject the responsibility that the attorney
owed to the client and instead upheld the rights of the attorney.
In contrast, the Balla court, by rejecting the attorney's assertion of
his rights and requiring that he uphold his responsibilities to the
client and the public at large, appears to adhere more closely to
Glendon's responsibility-based approach than does the General
Dynamics court.
108. Id. at 109-10.
109. See id. at 110.
110. General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 495 (Cal. 1994) (en
banc).
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III. RESPONSIBILITY AND PERSPECTIVE
An examination of the holdings in Balla and General Dynam-
ics under a responsibility framework suggests that Balla is more
consistent with the "responsible" approach outlined by Glendon.
Although this responsibility-based analysis appears to offer a plau-
sible resolution to the disparities between Balla and General Dy-
namics, this analysis has arrived at a conclusion contrary to the
weight of scholarly authority. Following the Illinois Supreme
Court's holding in Balla, legal journals were flooded with in-depth
analyses of whether an attorney should be granted the right to sue
a client. As the General Dynamics court noted, "[D]espite the fact
that no more than a handful of such cases have been reported
nationally, scholarly comment on the issues raised in retaliatory
discharge tort claims by in-house counsel is disproportionately
large."' Such extensive commentary has resoundingly opposed
the Balla court's decision to deny in-house counsel the right to
sue."' The strength of the opposition to the Balla decision raises
questions as to the validity of the finding that the decision is sup-
ported by Glendon's analysis. Furthermore, the fact that the
weight of scholarly authority so strongly opposes Balla, while
Glendon's analysis suggests that it is the correct outcome, casts
doubt on the practical applicability of Glendon's approach to the
situations faced by Balla and Rose.
-A. The Rationale Behind Balla
Before addressing whether Glendon's approach produces the
correct result, it is important to recognize that the rationale em-
ployed by the Balla court may have been founded on misplaced
assumptions. For instance, the court was concerned that permitting
recovery by in-house counsel might compromise the trust that
constitutes the foundation of the relationship between an attorney
111. Id. at 500 n.5 (citations omitted).
112. See Elliott M. Abramson, Why Not Retaliatory Discharge for Attorneys: A Polem-
ic, 58 TENN. L. REV. 271, 278 (1991); Corello, supra note 55, at 405; Giesel, supra note
39, at 558-62; Raymis H.C. Kim, Comment, In-House Counsel's Wrongfid Discharge Ac-
tion Under the Public Policy Exception and Retaliatory Discharge Doctrine, 67 WASH. L.
REV. 893, 913 (1992). But see Steven S. Gensler, Note, Wrongful Discharge for In-House
Attorneys? Holding the Line Against Lawyers' Self-Interest, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 515
(1992) (arguing that discharge suits undermine the adversarial legal system which depends
on open communications between attorney and client).
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and her client. There is a common understanding based on trust
between attorney and client that encourages open and candid
communication. As the Balla court noted, "[T]he danger exists
that if in-house counsel are granted a right to sue their employ-
ers .... employers might ... limit their communication with their
in-house counsel."1 1 3 Although there is some validity to this ar-
gument, other factors may already limit a client's ability to engage
in completely candid communication with an attorney. For exam-
ple, Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct permits
an attorney to report attorney-client communications in order to
prevent a criminal act that may result in death or bodily harm."
14
Courts have recognized that attorneys' actions in revealing client
confidentialities pursuant to this provision may make clients "natu-
rally hesitant to rely on in-house counsel for advice regarding...
potentially questionable conduct." ' Thus, factors that serve to
"chill" attorney-client communications already exist and are, in
fact, permitted by the legal profession's ethics codes. Thus, if a
client is already hesitant to seek out counsel regarding illegal activ-
ity because attorneys can reveal client information pursuant to
Rule 1.6, it makes little sense to assume that the right of an attor-
ney to sue would suddenly create an impermissibly burdensome
chilling effect on attorney-client communications. Moreover, pro-
tection of the attorney-client relationship may be inappropriate
when it is the client, and not the attorney, who is abusing the
relationship.
Protection of the attorney-client relationship is not the only
basis on which courts have been reluctant to extend the tort of re-
taliatory discharge to in-house counsel. For instance, the Balla
court reasoned that in-house counsel should not be allowed a
cause of action against a client in order to avoid shifting the costs
of enforcing legal ethics codes onto clients:" 6 "[I]t would be in-
appropriate for the employer/client to bear the economic costs and
burdens of their in-house counsel's adhering to their ethical obliga-
tions under the Rules of Professional Conduct."11 7 Again, this
rationale disregards the fact that the employer's conduct, not the
113. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 109.
114. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1991). In some
states, disclosure may be required. See supra note 45.
115. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 109.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
117. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 110.
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attorney's, created the ethical dilemma."t Without the protection
of the right to sue, it is the attorney who must inevitably pay for
the client's unethical conduct.
Moreover, by refusing to recognize the attorney's claim, Balla
would force an attorney to choose between her livelihood and her
ethical obligations to the legal community. If she chooses to report
the conduct as required, she may lose her job; if she chooses not
to report the conduct, she has breached the ethics codes of her
profession. Denial of -the right to sue would also deprive an attor-
ney of the opportunity to prove that the dismissal was wrongful, a
factor that may be critical in procuring alternate employment. By
placing attorneys in this dilemma, the Balla court discourages
attorneys from making ethical choices consistent with community
standards.
B. Defining Glendon's Responsibility
Unfortunately, criticism of the court's decision to place a
premium on protection of attorney-client confidences and to disre-
gard the financial burden placed on in-house counsel does not
explain why a responsibility-based analysis creates a result so con-
trary to the legal commentary. However, the foregoing analysis
does demonstrate a number of assumptions made by the Balla
court that affect the validity of a responsibility-based analysis. In
particular, the Balla court assumed that because of the sanctity of
the attorney-client relationship, its analysis should proceed under
the assumption that, above all, the attorney is responsible to the
client. Although this assumption may be properly based on the
ethics codes governing the legal profession,"9 it is possible that a
responsibility-based approach would not focus on the responsibility
of the attorney. Glendon might ask the question asked by other
scholars, namely, "Why should the 'confidentiality' between the
attorney and the client be blindly sanctified when it can be em-
ployed as a shield behind which corporations can coerce attorneys
into wrongdoing? Why should there be confidentiality for a wrong-
doer or those scheming to do wrong?" ' Thus, under a responsi-
118. See id. at 114 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
119. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble §§ 1-2 (1992) (indicat-
ing that "a lawyer is a representative of clients," id. § 1, who "zealously asserts the
client's position, . . .[and] seeks a result advantageous to the client," id. § 2).
120. Abramson, supra note 112, at 286.
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bility-based approach, perhaps the analysis should focus on the
responsibility of the client, rather than that of the attorney. Fur-
thermore, it is possible to focus on the responsibility that society
at large may owe the attorney. Considering that the attorney may
be placed in such a difficult dilemma, it is reasonable to expect
society, which will benefit from the disclosure of a client's undesir-
able conduct, to aid the attorney in making the ethical decision.
By considering the responsibility owed to the attorney, rather
than from the attorney, the analysis of Balla and General Dynam-
ics changes, as can be seen by examining how the responsibility to
the attorney can be fulfilled. Grace Giesel has suggested employ-
ing several measures in order to consider the responsibility to the
attorney. She suggests that "[s]ociety can improve the plight of in-
house counsel... [by modifying] in-house counsel's calculus when
faced with an ethical demand of client-alienating behavior...
[and by lessening] the sacrifice that an individual in-house attorney
makes when choosing the ethical path.''. In particular, granting
an attorney the right to sue would lessen the detrimental impact
of ethical decisionmaking on the attorney. The attorney would not
be forced to sacrifice herself financially because she would no
longer be required to bear the costs of upholding the ethics re-
quirements. And by granting the right to sue the client based on
the responsibility owed to the attorney, the result would be con-
sistent not with Balla, but with the more intuitively correct holding
in General Dynamics.
This result would be preferable because it would represent
"[r]ecognition of the pressures upon in-house counsel.""12 Al-
though it would not prevent a client from discharging an attorney,
the attorney would no longer be forced to bear the financial bur-
den of upholding the legal ethics codes. Whereas under Balla, the
client was rewarded for unethical behavior because of her ability
to shift the costs to the attorney,123 under General Dynamics, a
client may instead be required to compensate the attorney for any
financial loss resulting from wrongful discharge. Not only would
the opportunity for exploitation be lessened, but the attorney
would also be given the opportunity to clear her name, thereby
aiding the attorney in procuring future employment by decreasing
121. Giesel, supra note 39, at 538 (citations omitted).
122. Abramson, supra note 112, at 279.
123. Giesel, supra note 39, at 538-39.
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the stigmatic effect of being fired. Moreover, the elimination of fi-
nancial and career disincentives indicates that the client must take
financial responsibility for her actions; it also increases the likeli-
hood that an attorney faced with the difficult decision of whether
to report the unethical conduct of her client will abide by the
ethical rules of the legal profession." 4
By shifting the focus of Glendon's responsibility-based analysis
to the client, incentives would be in place to encourage, rather
than discourage, ethical behavior. First, permitting the attorney to
sue for wrongful discharge would shape the behavior of the attor-
ney serving as in-house counsel. When faced with the decision of
whether to report unethical conduct, she would no longer be pres-
sured by financial considerations and could instead follow the
ethics codes without fear of unredressable repercussions. Beyond
shaping the behavior of individual attorneys, allowing an attorney
a cause of action may also improve the ethical behavior of the
clients. Requiring the client to make financial compensation for
the wrongful discharge may discourage that client from discharging
attorneys who report unethical conduct. A client is also less likely
to engage in unethical behavior when it is probable that an attor-
ney within the corporation will report that behavior.
Of course, permitting attorneys to bring a cause of action
following a wrongful dismissal does not eliminate all of the pres-
sures that encourage attorneys to make unethical choices. Al-
though an attorney may receive financial compensation once she
has been fired, she will not be reinstated to her former job. In
addition, there is no guarantee that the damages awarded by the
court will adequately compensate the attorney for her losses. Nor
does the decision alleviate the difficulties an attorney must face
when seeking future employment. A corporation may be reluctant
to hire an attorney who was fired, even though the dismissal was
wrongful. For example, a corporation that does not adhere to
ethical standards will decline to hire an attorney who is likely to
blow the whistle on its conduct. Even an ethical corporation may
be reluctant to hire an attorney who did not show a high level of
loyalty in her previous job. However, the plight of in-house coun-
124. Although General Dynamics encourages attorneys to report the unethical conduct
of a client, it is important to note that it is unclear whether such a disclosure would be
required by law. See supra text accompanying notes 45 and 105.
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sel will be significantly improved, and both society and the client
will have taken the responsible approach.
Focusing instead on the responsibility of the client and society
at large, this version of the responsibility-based approach would
create results more consistent with both scholarly commentary and
basic equitable principles. The attorney who fulfills her respon-
sibility to society by reporting misconduct would not be unduly
penalized, and the client that under Balla would reap the benefits
would be held responsible for her prior unethical conduct. While
changing the perspective would provide a more equitable result, it
also demonstrates a critical weakness in Glendon's analysis.
Glendon, in discussing rights-based dialogue, notes that "[i]n truth,
there is very little agreement regarding which needs, goods, inter-
ests, or values should be characterized as 'rights' ... ."2s
However, she fails to explain why the difficulties inherent in defin-
ing rights would not exist in defining responsibilities. As Professor
David Abraham noted, "Like Communitarians generally, Glendon
wants a law more closely linked to morality-but whose? Which
community or religious faith should provide the requisite ethical
base-and to whom?"' 26 The definitional problems can be seen
by examining General Dynamics and Balla. When focusing on the
responsibility of the attorney, the analysis supports the result in
Balla. However, when the analysis focuses on the responsibility of
the client and society, General Dynamics appears to be the most
logical result. It is difficult to understand how a responsibility-
based approach can be of practical use when the definitional prob-
lems create such disparate results.
Application of Glendon's approach to the dilemma facing in-
house counsel reveals other weaknesses in Glendon's approach,
such as her failure to take practicalities into account. Not only
does Glendon fail to tackle the definitional problems inherent in a
responsibility-based approach, but she also appears to disregard
the fact that "not all problems can be solved satisfactorily within
their embedded social contexts."'2 7 For instance, it is unavoidable
that, for many in-house attorneys, the client has a great advantage
over the attorney. First, the client holds all of the financial power
in the relationship: "Loss of the attorney's one and only client
125. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 16.
126. Abraham, supra note 29, at 957.
127. Barton, supra note 31, at 809.
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reduces profitability to zero."128 While the attorney's loss of her
job could create financial havoc, the client need only hire another
attorney to replace the fired attorney. Moreover, the power that
an attorney may have as a virtue of her position as in-house coun-
sel may be overestimated:
First, it is not clear that in-house attorneys are more powerful
than other employees. In-house counsel's access to confidential
information (and resulting power against the employer) is not
unique. Although in-house counsel is usually exposed to more
areas of operations, non-lawyers also have access to extremely
sensitive information; this assumption underlies whistleblower
statutes that encourage reporting by employees. However, if the
court is assuming that professional employees have greater job
security because of their ability to blackmail their employer by
threatening to reveal embarrassing information, attorneys are at a
disadvantage. Unlike other employees, attorneys are bound by
the ethical codes not to reveal information obtained from their
client-employer. Therefore, in-house attorneys are at least as vul-
nerable as other middle- and senior-level managers who do have
standing to sue.'29
Despite the potential imbalance between attorney and client,
Glendon does not offer a solution as to how this imbalance should
be incorporated into her responsibility approach. Nor does she
offer a means to address those situations in which, because of a
power imbalance, it is necessary for an individual to exert her
rights. As Professor Thomas Barton has noted, "Retaining a resid-
ual rights talk thus allows for a dialogue of protection that we
may sometime value as much or more than community tradi-
tions."' 30 If the attorney relies solely on responsibility language,
the result may be loss of employment. Moreover, it is difficult to
understand how responsibility language would be sufficiently pow-
erful to prevent unethical conduct from a client who would later
fire an attorney for her ethical behavior.
Finally, as Glendon's approach is based on the use of respon-
sible language, she presupposes that the resulting dialogue will
128. Giesel, supra note 39, at 536 ("Exalted statements that most in-house counsel
possess such high ethical standards that economic pressure cannot sway them, no matter
how great, are, unfortunately, suspect.").
129. Corello, supra note 55, at 404-05 (citations omitted).
130. Barton, supra note 31, at 813.
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actually reach the intended audience. In the situation of in-house
counsel, the attorneys and the clients may not be involved in the
dialogue. Due to the nature of the position, in-house attorneys are
typically very isolated from other members of the legal profession.
Whereas members of law firms are surrounded by other members
of the Bar, in-house counsel may be the sole attorney on staff.13 '
Thus, although decisions such as Balla may be full of responsibility
language, the fact that in-house counsel may be isolated from the
legal profession, and too busy handling corporate matters to follow
every decision handed down by the courts, reduces the likelihood
that the court's language can shape behavior. It is difficult to
imagine the beneficial impact of the language of responsibility
when that language may not even be heard.
CONCLUSION
Glendon, in her exploration of society's fascination with rights
talk, provides a useful framework for the realization that our cul-
ture has become obsessed with rights and has failed to include
adequately a language of responsibility into American jurispru-
dence. However, the shortcomings in her theory could potentially
undermine the very goal that she is trying to achieve: the creation
of a more responsible society. Glendon's theory fails to offer tan-
gible guidance to courts confronted with situations in which both
sides of a dispute have adverse interests yet each side owes a duty
to the other; no framework exists for determining whose responsi-
bility should govern. Without a hermeneutic for reconciling the
definitional problems inherent in Glendon's approach, application
of her theory can lead to the inequitable result of Balla, where the
court assigned responsibility, and hence punishment, to the ethical
attorney and assigned rights, and hence rewards, to the unethical
client. Unless courts, or Glendon herself, can develop a principled
theory to determine whose responsibility trumps when more than
one party should have responsibility, the courts, in their efforts to
enforce the responsibilities an attorney owes a client, will continue
131. This isolation can affect the behavior of in-house counsel: "In addition to the
substantial economic disincentive, the secluded nature of the in-house situation reduces
the malpractice threat and the chance of independent reports to the Bar." Giesel, supra
note 39, at 537.
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to allow "a corporate employer to discharge its in-house coun-
sel ... without fear of any sanction ... [, thereby giving] the
assistance and protection of the courts to scoundrels." '
132. Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 114 (Il. 1991) (Freeman, J., dissenting).
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